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Abstract: The economic crisis that began in 2008 struck the United States harder
than many other countries. The responses to that crisis have to some extent rein-
forced patterns of policy making in the United States, but in other cases have
been marked departures from the liberal traditions of American governance.
This paper details the patterns of response in the United States and discusses the
implications for future governance.
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The economic crisis that began in 2008 affected the United States more extensively
than it did many other industrialized democracies, and the effects of that crisis also
appear to be lingering longer there than in many other countries. The extremely risky
banking and insurance practices that helped fuel a major economic boom for some
years before the crisis proved to have created a massive bubble. That bubble burst, as
they all do, and created numerous problems for citizens and businesses. Bankruptcies,
foreclosures, and unemployment quickly followed in the wake of the collapse of
Lehman Brothers and the recognition of just how much bad debt had accumulated in
the financial system.
As well as presenting significant problems for the private sector, the economic crisis
raised a number of problems for the public sector. Many of these problems were simply
about money, and the need to support the private sector with public money in order to
prevent greater decline of the economy. The huge amounts of money that went into the
banking and insurance industry, and then into the automobile industry, were funded by
borrowing and created a significant increase in the already substantial public deficit.
These extensive public policy reactions began under the administration of George W.
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Bush and continued and were increased by the incoming Obama administration.
The government responses were massive in financial terms, although when deflat-
ed were not much larger than some previous interventions in the economy. But the
structural transformations of the governance system may well have been of greater
significance than the number of dollars borrowed or spent. As will be described below,
the federal government has considered a number of significant transformations of the
relationships among actors involved in economic management. Likewise, the federal
programs that have been adopted have exerted a substantial influence over the rela-
tionship between the federal government and the states. Public spending has been a
major instrument in altering the federal bargain in the United States (and other federal
systems), and spending in this current crisis has been a part of that change.
Although the economic crisis has been more significant in the United States than in
most other countries, to some extent the reactions have not been proportionate. Most
Americans, both political leaders and average citizens, however, believe that there
have been immense and even fundamental transformations of the system of gover-
nance. Shock at the large-scale downturn in the economy prevented any significant
reactions to initial efforts to ameliorate the crisis, to the extent that some of the impli-
cations did not appear to be internalized well. As the magnitude of public expenditure
involved in the bailouts and in support for the banks has become more apparent, there
has been growing public concern and dismay.
The amount of money involved in the federal government’s recent bailout pro-
grams is indeed massive. Likewise, the direct intervention of the federal government,
using this money, in the management of the productive economy has been significant,
and seems to represent a marked deviation from the usual pattern of American govern-
ing. By buying portions of General Motors and AIG, and by taking stakes in a number
of major banks, the federal government came closer to nationalizing industries than at
any time since World War II.
That said, the federal government did not exercise the power that it might with its
involvement with the various industries. Newspapers have published numerous edito-
rials about the need for the federal government to use its powers in the boardroom, but
until now government has not taken that more extreme step, despite a number of inter-
ventions that already appear extreme to many citizens. The federal government has to
some extent become situated between the need to influence the economy and the tradi-
tion of minimal federal intervention in the economy.
This apparent contradiction demonstrates a good deal about the political culture of
the United States and also about the institutional structure of American politics. Pro-
ducing real change in the American political system, even when faced with a major
crisis, is difficult. Further, even if there are temporary transformations of the patterns
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of governance, the institutional system has a good deal of resistance to change and
may revert to type as soon as the crisis is over. Indeed, there is some evidence of a
return to some of the earlier patterns of governing although the crisis is hardly over,
indicating the usual pattern of path dependence noted for most governments. Finally,
this failure to produce more effective change in the system is a reflection of the parti-
san gridlock in American politics and the difficulties in creating any sort of consensus
about public policies (Brady and Volden 2005).
GOVERNANCE FAILURES
A good portion of the responsibility for the current economic crisis could be laid at
the doorstep of government, especially the federal government. This paper refers to
governance failures in which the design of institutions and procedures to regulate the
economy and society have proven inadequate for the complexity of the challenge.
These failures manifested themselves at one time, but they developed over several
decades and represent the gradual deterioration of state capacity for control (Painter
and Pierre 2008).
Although the Bush administration was generally associated with weakening regu-
lation of the private sector, one of the major regulatory problems that facilitated the
crisis was a product of the Clinton administration. In particular, in the mid 1990s the
long-standing federal law preventing banks from engaging in nonbanking financial
transactions, such as brokering stocks and bonds, was repealed. This also meant that
specialized investment banks and ordinary banks could merge to create unified finan-
cial service firms. This consolidation of activities may have been desirable for these
firms, but it exposed ordinary citizens to much greater risk as their checking accounts
were now to some extent linked with risky hedge funds.
The other major governance failure during this time, and perhaps more strongly
during the Bush administration, was the failure of the regulatory regime to keep pace
with the continuing transformations of the financial instruments bought and sold in the
market. At the most fundamental level, the subprime mortgage lending industry grew
with almost no regulation from the federal government or from the states. This lack of
regulation affected not only the people who purchased these loans but also the
investors who bought the derivatives and credit swaps that were based on them.1
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1. Subprime mortgages were home loans sold to buyers offering below-prime interest rates, at
least for the first several years. After that time, either the rates increased or a large
“balloon” payment was required or both. Typically these loans required little or no down 
Therefore, when these loans began to go bad, the entire financial structure was under-
mined because of the many other instruments that were based on them.
In addition to the specific governance failures manifested during the Clinton and
Bush years, some more general aspects of American government can also be associat-
ed with the broader governance failures that helped precipitate the economic crisis.
One of the most important of these has been the fragmentation of government in the
United States. In particular, the fragmented regulatory structure appears to be poorly
matched to the increasingly integrated financial sector that it regulates. The financial
sector is regulated at the federal level by the Securities and Exchange Commission, the
Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Depart-
ment of the Treasury, and the Department of Justice. There is also a certain amount of
financial regulation at the state level, with differences across states. The absence of a
coherent regulatory framework almost certainly contributed to the development of the
economic crisis.
Individual financial regulatory agencies also have substantial internal fragmenta-
tion that may limit their capacity. Although not directly a cause of the financial melt-
down, Bernard Madoff’s disastrous Ponzi scheme is a clear example of this problem.
It was not caught by the Securities and Exchange Commission, even though its staff
had all the information they needed to detect the fraud. Different parts of the puzzle
were held by a number of divisions within the main office, as well as in two regional
offices, but they never shared the information (SEC 2009).2 The tendency of organiza-
tions (or departments within organizations) to hoard information is hardly a new phe-
nomenon (Stinchcombe 1990), but it appears to have had a significant impact on gov-
ernance failures.
In short, regulatory failures, along with more general governance failures, had been
accumulating within the U.S. federal government for some time. These failures might
have remained benign for many years, but the numerous changes within the economic
sector itself exposed them. These problems were at the heart of the economic crisis
and are also at the heart of the more recent attempts to reform economic governance
and to revitalize U.S. economic regulatory programs. Although these have been major
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payment, unlike conventional mortgages. They were sold primarily to first-time buyers
who did not have sufficient credit to purchase a conventional mortgage, and were premised
on house values continuing to increase rapidly so that when the rates changed there would
be sufficient equity in the house to extract for the payments. When house prices did not
rise, this house of cards began to collapse.
2. This is analogous to the intelligence failures that were associated with the attacks of Septem-
ber 11, 2001. In this case it was separate divisions of the same office, as well as different
regional offices.
governance failures, they also represent opportunities for government to respond
favorably and to produce more effective governance (Khadamian 2009).
GOVERNANCE RESPONSES IN THE UNITED STATES
The initial responses of the American government to the economic crisis occurred
toward the end of the Bush administration. When it became evident in the fall of 2008
that the collapse of several major financial institutions was possible, the administration
began to consider its options and the implications of the collapse for national economic
policy and institutions. The Bush administration, which was receiving the lowest
approval records for any American president in history, was thus confronted with a
major challenge while having very little legitimacy with the public. Nevertheless, the
federal government proceeded with a seemingly bold plan to attempt to stem the decline.
From a policy perspective, the federal government’s response to the crisis has
involved a range of instruments and strategic choices. Perhaps the most noticeable
aspect of these choices has been the shift away from indirect regulatory instruments
toward much more direct government interventions. Unlike many shifts in governance
over the past several decades, the change here has been away from softer instruments
toward more intrusive ones. Further, it has reversed a long movement away from a
strong central state and returned to a stronger role for the central government.
PUBLIC INVESTMENT IN, AND LOANS TO, PRIVATE FIRMS
In the context of American political traditions, the most remarkable aspect of public
sector intervention in the economy has been the government’s purchase of large parts of
major corporations. In the past, the federal government had either created its own pub-
lic corporations (for example, the Tennessee Valley Authority) or propped up failing
firms with loans (for example, Chrysler). In this crisis, however, the federal government
bought large blocks of stock in General Motors, AIG, and several banks. There were
also a number of major loans to banks, but these were less remarkable.
In the first instance, the Treasury purchased preferred stock in several government-
sponsored enterprises that were in serious danger of going bankrupt. These were the
mortgage lenders Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,3 which as crucial elements in the sec-
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3. Fannie Mae is the Federal National Mortgage Association, and Freddie Mac is the Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation. They both provide liquidity for private lenders in order 
ondary mortgage market were important for attempting to maintain liquidity in the
mortgage market. The housing market is central to the entire economy, and the numer-
ous problems associated with subprime lending made support for the housing market
all the more important.
This purchase of stock was a significant departure from the norm of economic
management in American government, but in some ways the shift was not so remark-
able. In particular, these purchases were conceptualized as short term, with the inten-
tion that the firms would as soon as possible be returned to fully private control. Fur-
ther, despite numerous criticisms, the federal government did not become involved in
the management of the firms in any significant manner. Owning the stock might be
seen to give the government a seat or two in the boardroom, but it eschewed taking
those positions in favor of providing direction indirectly and maintaining the appear-
ance of separation between government and the private sector.
Although the initial outlay of funds was substantial, there is already some evidence
that it may not only have propped up the firms but may also have generated some
profits for the federal government. This positive outcome was not really anticipated
when the decisions were made, although the programs were designed so that this
would be possible. In addition, the programs were designed so that the firms involved
had incentives to repay their loans and to get the federal government out of their busi-
ness as soon as possible.4 The problem from a policy perspective has been that there
was no regulatory program in place to control these organizations (especially the
banks) once the money was repaid.
In summary, the level of involvement of the federal government in private firms
since the economic crisis began has been unprecedented. There were a number of ear-
lier instances of the federal government lending money to the private sector, but this
direct involvement has been exceptional. That said, this remained an arm’s-length
involvement so that statements about the meddling of government in management
could be kept to a minimum.
PUBLIC SPENDING
The problems of deficit and debt associated with the bailout of the economy and
the stimulus package are obvious. These problems help, however, to make apparent a
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to maintain the capacity to offer mortgages to would-be home owners.
4. In particular, the compensation to top executives was more limited while companies were
in receipt of the federal funds.
more fundamental problem of governance: the incapacity of American government for
the past decade to control public expenditure and to manage an effective political
economy. President Clinton was able to run a balanced budget for several years and to
impose some limits on public expenditure (Shick and LoStracco 2000). The balanced
budget was not his success alone; Congress cooperated in restraining expenditure and
not reducing taxation.
The Bush administration was perhaps the most disastrous for public budgeting in
the United States. Despite the War on Terror and the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, this
administration passed a massive tax reduction, apparently in the vain hope that eco-
nomic growth would produce sufficient tax revenues even at the lower rates. That did
not, of course, materialize, and the largest deficits since World War II (relative to
GDP) were the result. Other policy initiatives aimed at reducing expenditure (such as
privatizing Social Security) were not successful, and the high deficits persisted.
This failure of fiscal probity during the Bush years was not a result of his actions
alone, but required the active involvement of Congress. In terms of governance issues,
the role of Congress was perhaps more egregious, given that a significant amount of the
spending that continued was done through earmarked expenditures that benefited indi-
vidual legislators’ constituencies rather than serving a broader public purpose. Ameri-
can government has had a continuing problem with the private use of public power
(Lowi 1979), but this problem appears to have grown over the past several decades.
This and other governance problems partially reflect the increasing polarization of
American politics and the difficulties in reaching the consensus needed for stable and
effective governing (Peters 2005). For example, part of the logic for the tax cuts for
some Congressional Republicans was to “starve the beast”—to deny the government
adequate funds to govern effectively (McCaffrey 2008). The dominance of ideology
over the real governance needs of the American political system has produced a con-
tinuing problem for politics in the United States and its government and threatens to
undermine governing effectiveness even more than it did in the past.
One may hope that the governance failures outlined here might lead to a more
cooperative form of governance. That hope seems largely unfulfilled at present, given
the lack of cooperation between the parties on efforts to recover from the economic
crisis. In most Congressional votes since President Obama took office and the Democ-
rats took control of Congress, there have been few if any Republican votes in favor of
the President’s poprosals, even though the policies being considered were very similar
to those implemented by the Republican Bush administration. To some extent, ideolo-
gy and partisanship appear to have become more important than problem-solving in
defining the responses of the U.S. federal government to the economic crisis.
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INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
As noted earlier, fragmentation of policy making and regulation has been a signifi-
cant factor contributing to the economic crisis. Even if there had been adequate regula-
tion of the financial sector, as there was not, it might have still been ineffective given
the difficulties in having the regulators work together. This problem is long-standing
but has become increasingly unviable given the integration and complexity of the
financial sector. This lack of integration has caused problems both in monitoring
financial institutions and in designing policies to regulate them.
Almost from the outset of the crisis, economic policy making in the United States
became increasingly centralized. In the Bush administration, the secretary of the Trea-
sury became the point man on economic policy and attempted to pull together the var-
ious strands of governing. The Federal Reserve System became, and has remained, a
central actor in this effort. In institutional terms, this is important because, legally and
in practice, the Federal Reserve has maintained a politically independent stance. Its
purpose is to provide an independent monetary authority that can ignore political pres-
sures and make decisions based entirely on economic criteria.
As economic policy making has evolved during the past year, the Federal Reserve
and its chairman have become central actors in the policy process, even though the
president remains in control of the policy. This is another significant transformation of
the arrangements for governing the American economy. Indeed, part of the centraliza-
tion of the policy process in response to the economic crisis has been to increase presi-
dential involvement in economic policy. In the United States there has always been a
troika (the director of the Office of Management and Budget, the chair of the Council
of Economic Advisors, and the secretary of the Treasury), or a troika plus one (the
chair of the Federal Reserve), advising the president on economic policy, and now the
latter is becoming more and more important.
As well as emphasizing the role of senior officials in governing the economy, the
crisis also led to the creation of a number of “czars” responsible for one or another
aspect of the crisis, such as overseeing the program subsidizing the purchase of new
automobiles. These officials represent a significant departure from using agencies as
the means of implementing programs and focus accountability on the individual. This
strategy also tends to minimize the control of Congress over the programs and alters
the distribution of powers within the federal government.
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INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
The large-scale international involvement of the United States was another feature
of the response of the federal government to the economic crisis. Although globaliza-
tion is as real for the United States as for the remainder of the world, federal policy has
not always reflected that reality. However, there have been attempts almost from the
beginning of the current economic crisis to coordinate policies with the other major
industrial countries. This coordination was evident even during the Bush administra-
tion, which until then had adopted largely unilateralist positions on most aspects of
foreign policy.
With the Obama administration, the international dimension of the response to the
economic crisis has been accentuated. There have been numerous efforts to coordinate
policy responses with trading partners and to find common solutions to the problems.
These efforts have not been without their difficulties, largely because of fundamentally
different approaches to the role of government in the economy. Despite those differ-
ences, some common solutions have been possible, and the degree of policy linkage
among countries has increased to attempt to counter the problems produced by the
linkages of their economies.
The G-20 summit in Pittsburgh in September 2009 represented an institutionaliza-
tion of continuing cooperation among the major economies in managing their reac-
tions to the crisis and, with good fortune, perhaps preventing a recurrence. Coopera-
tion on economic policy is hardly new for the countries of the European Union, but it
is a significant change for the United States. If this process of cooperation does contin-
ue, then the long-standing autonomy of U.S. economic policy may be reversed. Politi-
cally, this perceived loss of autonomy for the United States will not be acceptable to
many citizens, especially conservatives in the Republican party.
FEDERALISM
One of the less obvious consequences of increased federal involvement in the
economy is some further centralization in the federal system of government in the
United States. The federal stimulus package was yet another federal grant program
that had strings attached and that has had the consequence of moving greater power to
Washington. This centralization has been the general pattern over at least the last half
century (Zimmerman 2008), but the stimulus package certainly continued the trend. It
did not permit the states to make their own decisions about how to spend the money.
The strings attached to stimulus funds caused at least six southern governors to
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refuse, if only for a limited time in most cases, to accept them. Funds offered to the
states were directed primarily to education, social services, and to some extent public
works. This is, of course, just the package of programs that ideological conservatives
oppose, and the governors who objected to the arrangement wanted the money simply
to be given to the states as a general-purpose grant. As well as maintaining account-
ability, the funding was designed this way because these purposes would place the
money into circulation most quickly.
Conflicts over the use of federal funds have intensified since the financial crisis
began. In particular, the health care debate in 2010 has produced efforts on the part of
at least 19 states to nullify the federal law. The governance failures of the fiscal crisis
appears to have created increasing distrust in the capacity of government to provide
effective governance.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The economic crisis might have been expected to provoke a major response by the
American government. At a superficial level, there have been a number of changes in
government and in its programs. Perhaps the most important of these changes have
been the institutional changes, both those that have been implemented and those that
are still being considered. Centralization of control over the economy is in part a nat-
ural political reaction to crisis, but in this case it also represents a more specific
response to the fragmentation of regulations in the United States. Creating a more uni-
fied approach to regulating the economy may not rectify all the problems encountered
in economic policy, but it may be a good start given the existing fragmentation in the
system.
The other major change in economic policy has been the greater involvement of
the federal government in private-sector organizations. By purchasing stock in a num-
ber of private enterprises and making major loans to others, the federal government
made a greater financial intervention in the private economy than at any previous time.
These loans are being repaid, with interest, so this may have been only a short-term
intervention, as was planned. It may, however, have opened the way to a continuing
active role for the federal government in the economy, which may become another
continuing source of policy conflict between conservatives and liberals.
Although there have been numerous policy initiatives in response to the economic
crisis, these responses may not have had a significant and continuous impact on gover-
nance in the United States. Even the more extreme manifestations of these responses
may be short-lived, and they have not altered the country’s basic political economy.
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All governments have some level of path dependency, but this represents substantial
persistence in the face of crisis. The institutional foundation of the United States has
been sufficiently strong to maintain itself in these circumstances.
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